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The founders dealt with computer software and hardware. At nrst they used the pri-
vate activity as their secondary job, only to gain supplementary earnings. These people 
v:orked for in Hungary wen-known, acknowledged institutions and big companies' research 
departments. They gave excellent work for quite low wages. The initiative idea of these 
professionals was merely to make more money, but the ongoing and strengthening conflicts 
with the managements forced them to make their own business. 
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In the decades of the socialism we were used to the fact, there were no 
spontaneous bankruptcies, nor swelling of companies, but only conducted 
happenings. Big, private enterprises did not emerge in reality, but such 
an idea did not even f!.ash up in the minds of party decision-makers and 
executives of market - as it could have been impossible, too. 
Except some short phases only, the private sector in industry and 
services had no way for prosperity. From the mid-70ies the private sector 
got big beats on its head. The turn came at the end of the 70ies, and at 
the beginning of the 80ies, when the rapidly growing foreign debt and the 
threatening economic crisis forced the party to do something. 
From 1982 it became possible to set up so-called gmk-s (economic 
work groups: a limited form of private venture) either as a full-time job 
or as a part-time one. The objective of gmk-s was to give the chance 
for creative people to make more money (working harder and much more 
than 8 hours a day) instead of political blusterings. Party leaders (and 
researchers, too) thought, that it is mainly a political step and will be 
restricted within the limited frame of the so-called market socialism. 
However, life moved in another direction. Gmk-s showed, a minimal 
level of liberalization could be enough for private sector to make their own 
business with great success. 
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It is Successful? 
This study tells the success story of a private company. This Venture 
was established in 1983, but some of the participants had stepped into 
the market one or two years before. The founders dealt with computer 
software and hardware. At first they used the private activity as their 
secondary job, only to gain supplementary earnings. These people worked 
for in Hungary well-known, acknowledged institutions and big companies' 
research departments. They gave excellent work for quite low wages. The 
initiative idea of these professionals was merely to make more money, but 
the ongoing and strengthening conflicts with the managements forced them 
tp make their own business. 
The big turn came in 1984, by taking the first steps on the PC-market: 
beginning the computer trade. Thanks to Hungarian shortage economy the 
market position, resulting in a speedy growth and 
high 
They began to work in the flat of one of them, but by nOVi their 
company has got in five towns, many shops, stores, 
a headquarter building, and a trade network with more than one hundred 
points. They have entered many new areas. Meanwhile their turnover grew 
from five million to 1,000 million forints, having a large part of the market 
in their hands (computer selling, software making, fax, machine 
selling). 
The unexpected success of some private ventures was due to the slight 
liberalization the 80ies. so-caned soft dictatorship in Hungary gave 
the chance to progress, but only for those ventures which could tolerate 
the different soft methods of the state. Not the tax regulations -
which dispreferred the sector - hindered the ventures, but also the 
pe;rL[la,nc:ll~ control from various authorities. 
name it from viord 'Sllcc:ess' sensed 
on its own skin the problems that were typical in socialism. 
In 1982 the idea of the company was oppressive; in 1990 it was 
natural. In this period one of the greatest problems of V'Jas hO'l1 to 
handle the question of and shares. This problem 
has created conflicts and tension even no!v;'<ld':1Y:s. 
;:naJ;i;;es of Growth 
The case study is about the stages of growth, possibilities, conflicts and 
problems, the changes in structure and functioning through the period 
1982 to 1989. The case study, based mainly on differentiates 
six - in some extent overlapping - stages. 
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2.1. First Stage: Disappointment 
The ongm of the story goes back to 1980. The four independent groups 
which have made up the venture were employed by big companies, in-
stitutions. Most or these were wen-skilled, bright men, having a 
world-wide learning of the high-tech of their profession, 'J'lith many pro-
fessional study trips behind them. worked in co,mpt:ltE~r 
both with hardware and software. 
The motivating factors were not on the side of !U,a,""U!5 a 
a small or but on the side 
ba,d-f'eelin!~, d.iscLPI)ointJme,nt, eiE;m,en1Ga:!:y DrnTate financial pr!ob,ler:rrs, 
company 
en()Uj2:h e'3crn.m€ss for dfE:ssing. hll,,,,ncr a car - so-caned 
factors accc!rdlin.g 
You can see here the syncircm:les of Dis-
interest in of manpower the customers 
·C7,~n·rh,r'. If a company or institution decided to pUlrcnacSe a compulter 
had to wait for two or three months for a letter of ac:kIlo·V'11ed.g€;IT.tel1t 
pC)mtllJ.g some 15 to 18 months deadline. 
What were the real motivators of I01ilnding SUO? As a n;;"c_n,rnp 
ap-
they began to work for organizations which needed good quality produc-
tion, which had money but not to throw out of the window. The 
employers tolerated and encouraged part-time jobs for one or two years. 
The organizations began to cooperate with the private ventures, giving out 
them jobs, and so more money for their employees. Thus ventures stabi-
lized manpower, and decreased wage conflicts. However, it could last only 
for a short period of time. The harmony came to an end. Conflicts emerged 
between the employees in and out or the ventures. The good productivity 
or the ventures appeared as spontaneous criticism on the big company's ac-
tivity. The ventures made it possible to trade those software and hardware 
licences, the developing and selling of which were hampered at their main 
workplaces for so many years. Both organizational leaders and employees 
could see and reel these conflicting events very dearly. 
In 1982 (i.e. the beginning of gmk era in Hungary) one could see many 
newly developed and successful ventures. The founders of SUC imported 
the professional and management knowledge, the new professional results 
into Hungary. They had previous experiences in Rand D, and in practice, 
too. So they decided in the autumn of 1983 that there is no other way out 
than founding sue. 
2.2. Second Stage: Stabilization 
sue was created by three gmk-s (previously departments of three different 
organizations). These united in a cooperative 'SUC'. The only reason to 
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make a cooperative of the three gmk-s was the favourable tax conditions 
for it, and in order to form a cooperative min. 15 founders were needed 
according to the law. In 1984 a fourth group joined SUC. So SUC was 
made up of four independently functioning teams, the leaders of which had 
coordinatory talks with each other only if it was unavoidable. 
With the fourth group a rapid and great change has begun for SUC. 
In 1984, at the time of a great 'Commodore fever' SUC decided to deal 
with PC-so In 1985 the Commodore fever was over. The prices of PC 
dropped down, increasing the market potential. The first business deals of 
SUC were related to their old company connections. However, SUC turned 
very soon to a new fragment of the market: there were organizations with 
less money, but with a demand for higher quality. These organizations had 
no time to wait eighteen months for computers. SUC made softwares for 
such companies (accounting, wage-calculating, storing-ordering, etc.) and 
helped to acquire and install the computers. 
Due to this market policy sue had no more uncertainty. Then sue 
moved from a 30 m 2 cellar to a rented large family house. It was para-
doxical, but the widening market caused a great problem: there was no 
computer in Hungary, the import was a state monopoly helping only the 
big organizations. They had no other choice than to organize their private 
import network - which was illegal. 
It became obvious, that on the Hungarian market - full of mono-
polies, various limitations - only a very modest liberalization gave so 
much freedom to the private sector which was enough for a speedy growth. 
But to achieve success, ma...1J.Y factors were needed: professional comlpeteJD.c<e, 
coping with market limitations and state solving the inside 
conflicts, the mt:rao:rgaruz,atlcmal power 
the m,anagenlellt. 
2.3. Third 1tU1nni.:ng-:m 1985-88 
Besides the favourable market to achieve success the appropTi<~te 
organization of their own activities also was needed. 
The most important feature of these early years was the non-organiza-
tion-like activity. There was no hierarchy, no bureaucracy, no departmen-
talization, no work distribution at sue. Everybody made every kind of 
work: computer selling, software making, financing and purchasing, re-
pairing, carrying, transporting, filing, documenting, calculating, etc. 
The greatest problem was the finding of computers and the whole con-
figuration. The import channels (and the currency needed to import) were 
practically reacheable only for the big companies near to power. The Min-
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istry strongly resisted to any private claims of dollar. The only workable 
way was the private import. 
In order to have their import stabilized, sue employed a man with 
a good personal network at the export-import black market. Such activity 
was 'helped' by the governmental 'liberalization' from 1985, from when at 
the border customs the baggages have not so strictly gone through. 
The second phase of liberalization was the so-called OKISZ-dollars 
(OKISZ: State governed centre of cooperatives). In the 1980ies great in-
vestments were put in the heavy industry yielding no great results at all. 
To compensate, and hush up this economical fiasco the made 
concessions: heavy industry may sell its produced dollars (from export 
trade) on black market to (Earlier every 
dollar had to be transferred to the National of the 
was from the cooperatives to the industry. 
The third possible way was the barter business: goods for goods. This 
kind of trade was a little better tolerated for sector; and went on 
much smoother when a state owned company was involved. sue chose 
this way from 1985. It looked for such Hungarian companies the products 
of which were not saleable or only at very low price. 
Such solutions were effective but archaic methods: to make business, 
to produce money, but to avoid any formal, bureaucratized organization. 
Ventures having voted on this in non-organization-like way remained small 
businesses. 
The managers of the first three groups - maybe spontaneously -
chose the other way. The first step was (forced by the environment) the 
stabilization of input. Thanks to a small liberalization there has been a 
Far-Eastern business bureau in Hungary. After realizing that the direct 
import from Taiwan and South Korea was maybe by 30-40% cheaper than 
from Western Europe, they turned to this bureau. Soon they also travelled 
to the Far East and started the direct import. This input stabilization 
strengthened as the currency resources changed from private to organized 
forms (barter, OKISZ). 
The second step was to find a joint venture in Vienna. Through a 
'chain of acquaintances' they got to a Hungarian man who inherited a 
factory in Austria. He was (formally) the foreigner. So, SUC had a trading 
company, factually a rented flat in Vienna, where it was able to play false 
the Hungarian foreign trade state monopoly. Some large Hungarian state 
companies having dollar could very easily buy anything from the Venture 
in Vienna a little cheaper (we name it SUC V in the followings). SUC V 
began to export computers even into Czechoslovakia and to the USSR. 
SUC also had many problems with obtaining import licence. 
102 I. JAVOR 
At the end of 1987 government decided to take the assets of the co-
operatives into state ownership. These measures shocked among others 
sue, too. They decided to transform the venture into a shareholding com-
pany, involving foreign capital. By 1989 sue set up the new form while 
not touching the old frames either. So at the same time sue was made 
up of four gmk-s, four Itd-s, one cooperative and one share-holding com-
pany. This eclectic form caused some problems, but helped sue to avoid 
taxpaying, using and playing with the facilities legally. 
2.4. Fourth Stage: Reorganization, 1985-86 
Reorganization was motivated by the technological change (trade) and by 
the rapid growth of turnover and profit. 
The fourth group has begun the trade from the autumn of 1984. Since 
so much profit could be obtained of trading, the other three groups de-
cided to take it up, too. This step changed the original independence of 
groups. The group began with strict coordination on configurations, of-
fered conditions, terms, prices. The three groups decided to handle the 
turnover, expenses and profit of trade not separately but together as a 
whole. They divided the profit evenly between the three groups, inde-
pendently of the individual achievements. This was the first step in the 
direction of functioning. 
The fourth group said 'no' to coordination. The tension to'ppea 
the end of 1985 in connection with the Far t;(i£l;er'n r'ela,tl!On5. 
The fourth interest • 2 , In ~ne W,estA;ier'man business connec-
tion. The 'hidden' interest of the rest of the Venture Vias not to 
immediate for a but also to build up the stable environmental 
to increase the SUC's market etc. This 
interest motivated the three groups to of 
uLllt!edness, and cheaDe:Y The boss no 
choice than to leave 
Some months later the four groups united the 
a marketing man. A year in the second half of 1987 a trade depart-
ment was built up. Trading needed maintenance. It was unavoidable to 
build up a service But the managers hated bureaucratization 
and feared of financial and other state controis. The management decided 
to found a service cooperative (SUe S). Due to missing law regulations on 
ULiYCLL'C ownership and property rights, the foundation was not successful: 
sue S grew out of the 'mother's' control and soon became her rivaL In 
1989 sue newly developed its own service. 
Practically, in 1989 the basic elements of a formal, bureaucratized 
organization developed. For some years (1985 to 1988) the trade depart-
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ment has developed horizontally. The bureau in Czechoslovakia and USSR 
and in Hungarian country towns worked parallelly, in cooperation with the 
headquarters. But in 1987-88 it became obvious, that this cooperation Ca.ll-
not assure the optimal use of stores. A computer was missing at one store, 
needed hierarchically but was in surplus at the other. 
management and information 
hierarchization of the trade npn;;Lr7:rnpn7: 
This led to the wiJful, conscious 
at the of 1988. 
2.5. 
mana~~e!ne:nt had five men: the ;hard core? ~ the bosses of the three groups, 
the m.anagers of the fourth group and one of the irade$ The core made 
most bnsiness dealt with old cnstomers. 
no POSSID111tHos 
ensure their DrotJ,eItv This led to pe:rIJtlane:nt cn.an.ge:s in the owners' 
You can see two lines of tension: bew/een non-managers and man-
agers; and betweeen n(m··rulal:laglJl1g founders and new-comers. This latter 
comes from the different of the founders and 
new-comers (traders). 
Between the m8.,nagers and !ourtd,er15, 
¥!ere in the mana~;elnent krlo1,vledge and the protlta,bility 
At the beginning the difference between managers rest 
was slight. organized and controlled software the other did 
the software. The profit was based on the same thing: software. But 
trading was in the hands of the traders and managers, the software 
makers to the periphery. 
This segregation moved along with the great change in the content of 
management. In 1983-84 management was: management of profession. 
The main function of the management was to sell the whole software-
making capacity. From 1984 a new function came to the surface: the 
management of profit. What to do with the 'surplus' money? They bought 
a ground plot, in order to build a business centre. The managers began 
to deal with the interest rate conditions, handling credits and investments. 
They entered the lessing market. The stabilization of inputs was the prelim-
inary to the new phase: the management of organization. Getting nearer 
to the organization-like structure and functioning, the content of manage-
ment widened with budgeting, motivating (incentive system), controlling, 
organizing service, coordinating, financing, etc. So between the managers' 
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job, information, skill and the software makers' ones an unbridgeable gap 
opened up. 
A third tendency was the permanently decreasing status difference 
between the founders and the new-corners. The first slight change in the 
owner - founder status happened in 1986, when the fourth group in-
troduced a productivity-oriented incentive system to replace equality. In 
1989's summer the last group introduced this incentive system, too. In 1986 
(the first year when the number of the new-corners run over the founders) 
the new incentive system showed that the ownership mind shifted into the 
direction of employee mind among the founders. 
With this decision in 1988, the last main element of the division-by-
group also disappeared. It was succeeded by the division by hierarchy, 
~ork, functions, etc. 
Some years later everything turned upside down, and this drastical 
change was realized and legalized in their share holding company. 
This completed the push-back of the owner - founders' rights. The 
w'inners of the power game were the managers and some of the traders. 
2.6. Sixth Phase: Future - Bureaucraiizaiion, Diversification 
This case study told the success of a private business venture. In 1980 
some men decided to make more money in their part-time venture. After 
confiicting with their company, they decided to found a cooperative. Three 
groups made up sue. The later comers' fourth group has begun dealing 
-w-ith trade. The unbelievable profit of trade inspired the venture to step on 
a non-planned way. First the leader of the fourth group had no other choice 
than to leave sue. Instead of the permanently asserted independence of the 
groups, they became united step by step. The division by group changed 
into division by work, function. The managers and key-profit-making-men 
became OViners, the o'yvner - founders becanle similar to neVl-comers. The 
venture changed into a bureaucratic organization. 
In 1988 sue built up a four-level office block. Parallelly with the 
shareholding company the hierarchy and the departments vvere built up, 
too. New faces appeared in the new building and departments. 
Thus new branches, and activities have been developed. The founders 
have no competence or any knowledge to these activites. Accounting and 
tax advisoring, fax, copy machines, telephone networks, management cal-
culators, cash-registers, etc. The general manager said in 1989: 'The orga-
nization reached its optimal size.' It seems to me that this claim became 
outdated by the end of 1990. 
